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Abstract. Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper examines the association 
between the choice of financial intermediary and earnings management. We contend that with more 
stringent standards for certification and intense monitoring, highly prestigious underwriters restrict firms’ 
incentives for earnings management to protect their reputation and to avoid potential litigation risks, 
while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring by choosing low-
quality underwriters. Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverse association between underwriter 
quality and issuers’ earnings management. In addition, we find that underwriter quality is positively 
related to SEOs’ post-issue performance, even after controlling for the effect of earnings management. 
We also find that firms with low underwriter prestige and high levels of earnings management under-
perform the most. However, the effect of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long. 
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 Researchers examine various incentives for earnings management: contracting motivations, 
responding to anti-trust or other governmental regulations, and recently, capital market motivations. 
Positive accounting theory hypothesizes opportunistic earnings management and explains managers’ 
accounting procedure choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986).1  Kothari (2001) argues that the 
motivation for earnings management research has expanded from contracting and political process 
considerations in an efficient market to include earnings management designed to influence stock prices. 
He reports that a recent, popular area of research examines the joint hypothesis of market inefficiency and 
earnings management with a capital market motivation, for example, an incentive to manipulate accruals 
upward during periods prior to stock issues (Dechow et al., 1996). Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) and 
Rangan (1998) show evidence of unexpected accruals around equity offerings and find that post-issue, 
long-run operating and return performances are negatively related to earnings management. They 
conclude that market participants fail to adjust for earnings management adequately. Others emphasize 
the penalties arising from false earnings signals (DuCharme et al., 2004).  
While the impact of earnings management on the equity offering market has been studied 
extensively, the linkage between a firm’s choice of a financial intermediary and earnings management 
remains unexplored. The central aim of this paper is to document the relation between a firm’s choice of 
an underwriter in the event of a seasoned equity offering (SEO) and earnings management.2 We also 
examine the impact of this relation on post-issue performance.3 We argue that a firm’s decision regarding 
earnings management affects the choice of underwriters and vice versa, while the selection of 
underwriters is one of the most crucial factors leading to the success of equity offerings. Casual 
observation suggests that some firms prefer prestigious investment bankers and others choose the 
opposite. We maintain that firms that are more aggressive in their accounting decisions tend to use 
lower-quality underwriters to avoid intense monitoring because high-quality underwriters provide more 
stringent monitoring for better underwriter certification and to retain and accumulate their reputation 
capital.  
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In general, underwriters are supposed to act as agents for the issuers’ and investors’ best 
interests. Less-prestigious underwriters, however, ignore their gate-keeping roles to keep profitable 
underwriting assignments. In contrast, high-quality underwriters are seriously concerned about earnings 
manipulation and therefore attempt to enhance the transparency of economic earnings. In fact, our 
conversation with U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray indicates that underwriters, in general, are disturbed by 
the possibility of earnings manipulation by the SEO firms they underwrite. An investment banker also 
suggests that due to underwriters’ concern about earnings manipulation, high-quality underwriters 
usually hire high-quality auditors to prevent aggressive earnings management, which is consistent with 
Balvers et al. (1988), Elder and Zhou (2002), and Zhou and Elder (2004).4 Consequently, an inverse 
relation between earnings management and underwriter reputation is expected.5 We also anticipate that 
underwriter reputation protection, certification, and monitoring jointly mitigate agency conflicts and 
restrict earnings management, thereby reducing post-issue SEO underperformance.  
Overall, empirical findings support our predictions. Using a sample of SEOs, we find that our 
earnings management proxy of unexpected total accruals is negatively associated with underwriter 
reputation. Within the simultaneous equations framework, we also find that underwriter reputation is 
negatively associated with unexpected total accruals. This inverse relation remains qualitatively 
unchanged with other proxies of earnings management, such as performance-adjusted discretionary total 
accruals, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). Different measurement windows of accruals do not change 
the results. An examination of the offerings that are subject to SEC enforcement actions confirms the 
inverse association between underwriter prestige and earnings management. These results suggest that the 
involvement of more prestigious underwriters reduces aggressive earnings management in the SEO 
setting. In turn, firms with aggressive (conservative) earnings management tend to avoid high- (low-) 
quality underwriters.  
Our results also reveal that underwriter reputation is positively associated with post-issue return 
performance, even after controlling for the effect of earnings management and other confounding factors, 
implying that underwriter prestige reduces post-SEO underperformance. We further find that post-issue, 
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operating performance is positively related to underwriter prestige and that the post-issue market 
penalizes firms with aggressive earnings management that hire low-quality underwriters. However, the 
impact of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long, as the effect disappears after a 
year following the SEO’s active earnings management period. We interpret the above results as 
indications that prestigious underwriters monitor the top management for offerings, thereby mitigating 
agency conflicts and overvaluation of the issues, and therefore reducing potential post-issue SEO 
underperformance. SEO overvaluation and post-issue underperformance may be explained by the 
behavioral model proposed by Daniel et al. (1998), which is based on investor overconfidence and on 
changes in confidence resulting from the biased self-attribution of investment outcomes. Their model 
shows that public information can trigger overreaction to a preceding private signal, and such continuing 
overreaction causes momentum in security prices; however, this momentum eventually is reversed as 
further public information gradually draws prices back toward fundamentals. Thus, according to their 
model, biased self-attribution implies short-term momentum (overvaluation) and long-term reversals 
(post-issue underperformance).6  
Carter and Manaster (1990) examine the relation between underwriter quality and long-term IPO 
performance. McLaughlin et al. (2000) show that the market impounds the value of the underwriters' 
information and certification at the announcement of SEOs. However, these studies differ from ours in 
that they just examine the relation between underwriter quality and long-run market performance, without 
controlling potential earnings management effects. Recently, Chan et al. (2005) examine the impact of 
previously identified determinants (e.g., underwriter quality, earnings management, and venture capital 
backing) of long-run IPO performance. Our study highlights the effect of underwriter reputation on 
earnings management in SEOs, which differs from their focus on IPOs. Furthermore, while Chan et al. 
(2005) focus on long-term returns (four years), we examine various windows (from one to five years) of 
post-issue returns to show the lasting effects of both underwriter reputation and earnings management. 
We also examine operating performance in addition to stock returns. 
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This paper contributes to the accounting and corporate finance literature in two ways. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to address the association between underwriter 
prestige and earnings management around SEOs. This study is important in light of recent controversies 
involving top-bracket investment banks in the late nineties, which disregarded ethics and gave more 
emphasis to the fees that they generated from their clients. Contrary to these assertions, our findings 
suggest that, in the years 1990-1997, more prestigious underwriters, in general, tend to restrict issuers’ 
earnings management, and thereby sell the shares of firms with high earnings quality. Second, this paper 
addresses the relation between firms’ behavioral choice of financial intermediaries and earnings 
management, and therefore it provides the existing literature with an additional dimension to the array of 
incentives associated with earnings management.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section examines the related 
literature and provides testable predictions. This is followed by a description of the data and 
measurement. In section 3, we present the empirical results on the relation between underwriter choice 
and earnings management by SEO firms. We summarize our analyses in the final section. 
 
1. Underwriter choice and earnings management 
1.1. The endogenous determination of underwriter choice and earnings management 
To examine the relation between underwriter choice and earnings management, we consider their 
endogenous nature because issuers choose underwriters and their reporting strategies simultaneously. We 
expect that firms with greater incentives for earnings management will avoid high-quality underwriters, 
and the extent to which earnings are managed is likely to be lower for firms that select high-quality 
underwriters. This inverse relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management can be 
inferred from the literature on underwriter reputation, certification, and monitoring.7 
First, high-prestige underwriters consider reputation capital important. Carter and Manaster 
(1990) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) suggest that underwriters, as repetitive players in the equity 
market, obtain and accumulate reputation capital. Underwriters gather information about an issuer’s 
 5 
future prospects and evaluate whether the information is bias-free. If material information is not properly 
disclosed and the stock performs poorly, then investors can sue the underwriters. Different underwriters 
are likely to have different loss functions because high-reputation underwriters with deep pockets are 
subject to more litigation risks. Consequently, more prestigious underwriters have more to lose in terms 
of reputation and hence are more selective about the firms they pick. 
Second, previous literature suggests that underwriters help reduce information asymmetry through 
certification in the United States (Booth and Smith, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1994; Ng and Smith, 1996; Puri, 1996; Dunbar, 2000; McLaughlin et al. 2000), the United Kingdom (Slovin et 
al. 2000), and Japan (Cooney et al. 2003). For instance, Booth and Smith (1986) argue that if the net benefit 
from revealing the true issuing-firm value of an SEO, after accounting for the cost of hiring a high-quality 
underwriter, exceeds the benefit of hiding the true issuing-firm value, then the firm will hire high-quality 
underwriters. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and McLaughlin et al. (2000) claim that high-quality 
underwriters can produce superior information about the firms they underwrite and have more stringent 
standards for certifying the issuing-firm’s value. In summary, we expect issuers with minimal incentives for 
earnings management to select high-quality underwriters to enhance underwriter certification, thereby signaling 
favorable information to the marketplace. Furthermore, firms selecting prestigious underwriters are less likely to 
manage earnings because high-quality underwriters restrict issuers from managing earnings for better 
certification. This indicates a negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management.  
Third, the negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management also can be 
inferred from the underwriters’ monitoring function. More prestigious investment banks have more 
money and more expertise and are therefore likely to perform higher-quality due diligence (monitoring). 
Block and Hoff (1999) and Miller (2000) suggest that underwriters conduct due-diligence investigations 
to ensure full and fair disclosure to investors regarding the securities being offered, promote efficient and 
transparent markets, and prevent potential lawsuits. These due-diligence investigations include an 
analysis of the issuer’s industry and discussions with the issuer’s management to examine the 
completeness and accuracy of information regarding the issuer. The information includes, for example, 
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the issuer’s current financial health, the validity of the security offerings, and the issuer’s future financial 
prospects, along with the independent auditors’ analysis and opinions. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) 
suggest that underwriter monitoring improves a firm’s performance and reduces agency costs, thereby 
increasing firm value. They argue that if there is little monitoring in place, some issuers avoid strict 
monitoring by choosing low-quality underwriters. As a result, firms selecting high-quality underwriters 
are less likely to manage earnings, suggesting a negative relation between underwriter reputation and 
earnings management. Hence, we expect that  
 
Prediction 1: Underwriter reputation is a decreasing function of earnings management, and vice versa.  
 
 
1.2. Underwriter choice, earnings management, and post-issue performance 
Prior literature reports the post-issue, long-run operating and stock market underperformance of SEO 
firms (Loughran and Ritter, 1995 & 1997; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). We also have evidence of 
the effect of underwriter reputation on the post-issue performance of IPOs (Michaely and Shaw, 1994; 
Carter et al. 1998) and the effect of earnings management on the post-issue performance of SEOs (Teoh et 
al., 1998b). However, the effect of underwriter choice on SEOs’ post-issue performance after controlling 
for earnings management is an empirical question that needs to be addressed, given the inverse relation 
between underwriter reputation and earnings management, as postulated in the previous section.  
The economic role of underwriters is to reduce market frictions, such as “information 
asymmetries” and “agency problems,” that otherwise increase the cost of capital. The role of underwriter 
reputation in reducing information asymmetries and mitigating the adverse selection faced by outside 
stockholders has been extensively studied in the context of IPOs.8 Even though SEO firms are not likely 
to suffer information asymmetries to the same extent as IPO firms, there are still information asymmetries 
regarding the expected future performance between the firms’ insiders and potential investors in SEOs. In 
addition, prior literature reports that SEO firms in the 1990s faced greater uncertainty due to an increased 
proportion of riskier offerings, such as NASDAQ and technology issues in the 1990s (McLaughlin et al., 
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2000; Corwin, 2003; Mola and Loughran, 2004). Based on this literature, we argue that there exists an 
information asymmetry between issuing firms and investors that can cause a temporal overvaluation of 
seasoned equity offers. A high-quality underwriter decreases information asymmetry by reducing the 
information gap between managers and investors through underwriter certification and intense 
monitoring, and inhibits short-term overvaluation, thereby reducing the potential underperformance of 
post-issue SEOs.  
The positive effect of underwriter reputation on post-issue performance also can be postulated 
from the underwriter’s role as a monitor of final offer pricing. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) argue that 
the level of monitoring is related to the level of intrinsic value, so that there is a “schedule” of certifiable 
offer prices, depending on the level of monitoring. Following Hansen and Torregrosa (1992), we argue 
that high-quality underwriters perform better corporate monitoring and that reputable underwriters 
monitor issuers to reduce the possibility of severe underpricing or overpricing.9  
If the certification and monitoring tasks are not performed adequately, the underwriter will 
damage its reputation. If an underwriter substantially misprices an issue, its reputation and future business 
are likely to be harmed. In addition, both the issuer and the investment bank can be sued. Consequently, 
we contend that underwriter reputation protection, certification, and monitoring together help decrease 
agency conflicts, possible SEO overvaluation, and therefore post-issue SEO underperformance. The 
implication that we draw from the above discussion leads to the following predictions. 
 
Prediction 2. (a) The quality of the underwriter has a positive impact on the post-issue returns of SEO 
firms, even after the effect of earnings management is controlled; and (b) the post-issue returns of SEO 
firms with aggressive earnings management that select low-quality underwriters decline more than those 
of SEO firms with conservative earnings management that hire high-quality underwriters. 
 
 
2. Data and measurement 
We obtain an initial sample of 1,950 common stock SEOs that occurred between January 1990 and 
December 1997 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. We terminate our sample in 1997 
to examine post-offering returns up to five years after the active earnings management period (i.e., up to 
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2002). We limit the sample to U.S. firms available on the COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Stock return data are obtained from the CRSP database and relevant 
financial variables are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Offerings by financial institutions are excluded 
because the nature of accruals for these firms is very different from that of industrial firms. We also 
exclude additional offerings filed less than two years after the initial public offerings to avoid the 
confounding effect of IPO performance.  
 Of the 1,950 offerings, we identify offering announcement dates for 1,489 offerings by searching 
press release wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) database system. We drop 63 offerings because the 
SEO was announced within two years of a spin-off or a merger creating the firm to avoid the effect of 
new firms. This process results in 1,426 offerings. The reputation score data of the lead underwriter are 
obtained from the updated list of the Carter-Manaster measure in Carter et al. (1998).10 We exclude 275 
offerings because the underwriter reputation score data are not available and further eliminate 561 
offerings due to insufficient data to calculate unexpected accruals, our measure of the empirical proxy for 
earnings management. Thus our final sample consists of 590 offerings. Actual samples used in the 
analyses are slightly different because the data availability varies for each regression analysis. 
Table 1 reports the sample statistics and data characteristics of 590 offerings. Panel A provides 
summary information on size and offering characteristics. The mean and median of the total book value 
of equity are $320 million and $79 million, respectively. The mean and median of the market 
capitalization of equity are $958 million and $264 million, respectively. The size of the issuers ranges 
considerably in the sample, as indicated by the large standard deviations. The mean and median proceeds 
from the offerings are $96 million and $54 million, respectively. The mean increase in shares due to the 
offering is 24%. Panel B illustrates that seasoned equity issues are not clustered by time periods. Panel C 
indicates that seasoned equity issues are clustered by industries. For instance, chemical products and 
computer industries comprise more than 22% of the sample.  
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We report the results with the unexpected total accruals suggested by Hribar and Collins (2002) 
as our proxy for earnings management. We discuss the results with an alternative proxy for earnings 
management in a later section. Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that studies using balance sheet data to 
calculate accruals are potentially contaminated in testing for earnings management. Following Hribar and 
Collins (2002), we calculate total accruals using the data obtained directly from the cash flow and income 
statements. Total accruals of firm i at time t are defined as: 
TACCit = [EBXIit – OCFit] / Ait-1                (1) 
where EBXI is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT item 76). 
OCF is operating cash flow (from continuing operations) taken directly from the cash flows statement 
(COMPUSTAT item 108 – COMPUSTAT item 78). A is total assets (COMPUSTAT item 44).  
Unexpected total accruals are estimated by the cross-sectional, modified Jones model (Jones, 
1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995), using two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. Unexpected accruals are the difference between realized accruals and predicted (normal) accruals 
(scaled by assets at the beginning of the quarter). The quarter of the last earnings announcement before 
the offering announcement is labeled Q(-1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after 
the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed relative to the offering 
announcement. A more detailed time line is described in Figure 1. We obtain earnings announcement 
dates from COMPUSTAT and the DJI database. We need SEO announcement dates and earnings 
announcement dates to calculate unexpected accruals and post-issue returns. 
Normal accruals in the event quarter are estimated as: 11 
NDAit = α1 (1 / Ait-1) + α2 (∆REVit / Ait-1  – ∆RECit / Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit / Ait-1)           (2) 
where ∆REV is changes in revenue from the previous quarter, ∆REC is changes in net receivables from 
the previous quarter, PPE is gross property plant and equipment, A is total assets, and α1, α2, α3 are firm-
specific parameters from the first-stage regression. Estimates of the firm-specific parameters are 
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generated using the following model and contemporaneous data of non-offering firms with the same two-
digit SIC code as the sample firm.12 
TACCjt = a1 (1 / Ajt-1) + a2 (∆REVjt / Ajt-1) + a3 (PPEjt / Ajt-1) +vjt           (3) 
where a1, a2, a3 denote the OLS estimates of α1, α2, α3. Unexpected accruals are calculated as: 
DAit = TACCit – NDAit                 (4) 
The median, unexpected accruals are significantly positive at the 1% level in quarters Q(+1) and 
Q(+2) and the greatest during the one-year period from Q(-1) to Q(+2). Rangan (1998), DuCharme et al. 
(2004), and Jo and Kim (2006) argue that managers have incentives to manage earnings in the later 
quarters, even after the offering announcement, because of concerns regarding lawsuits and ‘lock-up 
agreements’ (usually 90 to 180 days after a SEO) with underwriters. Teoh et al. (1998a) also argue that 
incentives to manage earnings are likely to persist in the months immediately after the offering. 
Consistent with those studies, we calculate the annualized unexpected accruals (DA0) for the one-year 
period, Q(-1) through Q(+2), around the offering announcement.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the selected variables used in the regression analyses 
for a full sample of 590 offerings. The CM ranking is the Carter and Manaster (1990) measure of 
underwriter prestige, as updated by Carter et al. (1998). The rankings range from 0 to 9, with 0 
representing underwriters with the lowest prestige. The mean CM reputation ranking for our sample is 
8.13 with a median of 8.75, indicating that, on average, SEO firms hired relatively high-quality 
underwriters during the sample period. As a proxy for earnings management, the mean and median DA0 
are 1.90% and 1.54% of the lagged total assets, respectively. These statistics suggest that, around their 
offerings, seasoned equity issuers boost their earnings by almost 2% of assets through unexpected 
accruals. The magnitude of the DA0 is statistically significant at the 1% level. During the sample period, 
the mean (median) value of AR1, the market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period 
after the Q(+2) earnings announcement, is -18.18% (-18.48%), indicating that equity-offering firms 
experience significant price declines after their offerings. This is consistent with prior research (Brav et 
al., 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 1995 & 1997; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995).    
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∆ROA1 shows a negative mean value (-1.69%), with a median value of -0.99%. These findings 
indicate that, on average, issuing firms tend to experience poor post-issue operating performance as well. 
SEO firms show positive operating cash flows during the period of offerings. The mean value of OCFlow0, 
cash flows from operating activities summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of 
Q(-1), is 2.13%, with a positive median value of 7.20%. For our full sample, the mean and median offer 
size, measured as offered shares divided by the number of pre-issue shares outstanding, is 26.86% and 
19.90%, respectively. These statistics are similar to those suggested by Altınkılıç and Hansen (2003) and 
Corwin (2003).  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Bivariate relations 
Table 3 presents the bivariate relations among underwriter reputation and earnings management, and 
other selected variables. The upper-triangle presents Pearson correlations and the lower-triangle 
summarizes the Spearman correlations of variables. Notably, the updated Carter and Manaster (CM) 
measure shows a significantly negative correlation with unexpected total accruals (DA0), indicating that 
earnings management is a decreasing function of underwriter reputation and vice versa. CM is also 
significantly positively associated with post-issue returns. Overall, this suggests that our bivariate results 
are consistent with our predictions 1 and 2 (a). In addition, consistent with Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) and 
Rangan (1998), we find an inverse relation between unexpected accruals and post-issue returns.   
To gain quick insight into the relations among underwriter reputation, earnings management, and 
post-issue performance, we report DA0 and the one-year, post-issue returns (AR1) for 30 individual 
underwriters in Panel A of Table 4. Based upon individual CM reputation rankings, 30 individual 
underwriters are classified into three categories: the top 10, the middle group 10, and the lowest 10 reputed 
underwriters. In particular, the top 10 investment bankers underwrite more than 44% of our sample SEOs, 
while the lowest 10 bankers underwrite only 3.22%. Notice also that Goldman Sachs alone underwrites 45 
(7.63%) offerings during the sample period. As expected, the mean value of DA0  for the top 10 (bottom 10) 
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underwriter group is the smallest (largest), while the mean value of AR1 for the top 10 (bottom 10) 
underwriter group is the largest (smallest). These results suggest a negative relation between underwriter 
reputation and earnings management, supporting our prediction 1, and a positive relation between 
underwriter reputation and post-issue performance, supporting our prediction 2 (a). In addition, the 
differences in earnings management and post-issue performance between the top 10 and the lowest 10 
underwriters are statistically significant. These results suggest the existence of heterogeneity, in which 
various types of underwriters systematically underwrite different types of securities. 
In Panel B of Table 4, the 590 SEOs are classified into four groups based on their CM reputation 
rankings. The lowest (highest) group consists of SEOs underwritten by underwriters with a CM rank that 
belongs to the first (fourth) quartile. The other two groups form the middle groups. The patterns are 
consistent with those in Panel A. Thus, the above preliminary results based upon various bivariate 
relations are consistent with our predictions. In the next section, we report the results based upon 
simultaneous association. 
 
3.2. The simultaneous relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management  
 
Considering potential endogeneity, we employ a structural model for an empirical representation of the 
relation between underwriter reputation, based upon the updated Carter and Manaster measure, and 
earnings management, proxied by unexpected total accruals. To reduce the possibility of model 
misspecification due to missing variables, we control for additional variables in the model, following 
prior research.  
Fernando et al. (2005) find that firm size and quality affect the choice of underwriters. Thus, to 
control for those effects, we include firm size (Size) and return on assets (ROA) as a proxy of firm size and 
quality. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Fernando et al. (2005) suggest that more prestigious underwriters 
are able to market larger offerings of equity. Accordingly, we add an independent variable of offer size 
(Off_Size) to the regression to control for any systematic influence that this variable may have. Balvers et al. 
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(1988) suggest that high-reputation underwriters use high-quality auditors more frequently. To control for 
the effect of auditor quality, we include an additional variable, NONB6 (an indicator variable of auditor 
quality set to equal 1 for non-big-six auditor, 0 otherwise). We predict that firms with growth opportunities 
will be more inclined to select high-quality underwriters to convey valuable information to shareholders. 
Thus we incorporate several control variables for investment opportunities into the regression equations, 
including Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of Tobin’s q. This measure of Tobin’s q is consistent with 
those of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Oxelheim and Randøy (2003). Skinner (1993) shows 
that several proxies of the investment opportunity set are associated with a firm’s accounting procedure 
choice. Following this literature, we include R&D intensity (R&D) and Tobin’s q in both the underwriter 
reputation and the earnings management regressions.   
Numerous studies have documented that unexpected accruals are negatively associated with 
operating cash flow, change in performance, and auditor quality (Dechow, 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Becker et al. 1998). We thus include operating cash flow, change in ROA, and auditor quality as 
explanatory variables. In addition, previous research suggests that the incentive to manipulate earnings 
upward is smaller for larger firms because they are more politically sensitive and any earnings 
management is more likely to be detected (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 
1981). Earnings management might increase when firms are close to violating debt covenants. We use the 
debt-to-equity ratio, LEND, to proxy the closeness to a debt-covenants violation.   
If simultaneity among variables is ignored and the ordinary least square (OLS) is applied to 
estimate the parameters of a system of simultaneous equations, the estimates will be biased and 
inconsistent. Thus, we employ the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation approach to estimate the 
following simultaneous equations:  
CM = a0 + a1 DA0 + a2 NONB6 + a3 ROA0 + a4 Size + a5 Off_Size + a6 R&D + a7 Tobin’s q 
          + a8 Industry dummies                (5) 
 
DA0 = a0 + a1 CM + a2 NONB6 + a3 OCFlow0 + a4 ∆ROA1 + a5 Size + a6 LEND + a7 R&D  
                        + a8 Tobin’s q + a9 Industry dummies              (6) 
where CM is the Carter-Manaster reputation ranking; DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to 
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Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1), NONB6 is an indicator variable of auditor quality, 
which is set to equal 1 for a NON-Big 6 auditor, and 0 otherwise, ROA0 is Year(0) ROA, measured as 
income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of 
Q(-1), Size is the log of the market value of equity at the beginning of Q(-1), Off_Size is the number of 
shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before the offering, R&D is the R&D intensity 
in the last fiscal year ending before the SEO announcement and calculated as the ratio of the annual R&D 
expenditures to total sales, Tobin’s q is Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of Tobins’ q,13 OCFlow0 is 
cash flows from operating activities summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of 
Q(-1), ∆ROA1 is changes in ROA, measured as year (1) ROA – year (0) ROA, Year (1) ROA is income 
before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3),14 
and LEND is long-term debt over total stockholders’ equity. 
An inspection of the order and rank conditions reveals that both equations are identified (see 
Judge et al. (1982) for a discussion). The Hausman test statistic for the endogeneity check is 193.9, and it 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, providing evidence of simultaneity. Table 5 presents the results 
of association between underwriter reputation and earnings management based on the estimation of 
simultaneous equations. In model (1), the results show that the included variables jointly account for 
36.51% of the variation in underwriter reputation and earnings management. As hypothesized, there is a 
significant, negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings management (t-value = -5.61 to  
-6.79). The results support our first prediction that underwriter reputation is negatively related to earnings 
management. 
Because prestigious underwriters are not easily accessible to small firms, small firms typically do 
not hire high-quality underwriters. For instance, highly reputable underwriters might not select small 
companies with growth opportunities and potential for future success due to firm size. As a result, we 
expect a positive relation between underwriter reputation and firm size. The results show that firm size is 
positively associated with underwriter reputation. In model (1), we also find that DA0 is positively 
associated with firm size. The result of the relation between DA and firm size is mixed. Although prior 
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research documents that DAs are negatively associated with firm size, some studies report a positive 
relation between these two variables (e.g., DeFond and Park, 1997; Becker et al., 1998). However, firm 
size can proxy many different things. One possibility is that the relation between DA0 and firm size is 
different for SEO firms. Another possibility is that multicollinearity affects the sign of the coefficient on 
the size variable and possibly other variables as well.  
To investigate these issues more closely, we conduct additional tests by excluding firm size in 
model (2). We find that, even after we exclude the firm size variable from the DA0 equation in Table 5, we 
continue to find the negative association between underwriter reputation and unexpected accruals. 
Overall, a potential firm size bias does not appear to change our inferences concerning the association 
between underwriter reputation and a proxy for earnings manipulation. 
Recently, Hahn and Hausman (2002, 2003) and the other extant literature on “weak instruments” 
indicate that if instruments are only weakly correlated with the included endogenous variables and the 
degree of endogeneity is not strong enough, statistical inference based on simultaneous equation systems 
will pose a significant bias. Donald and Newey (2001) and Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) recommend 
culling the weak instruments using only the strong variables. Hahn and Hausman (2003) also suggest 
using an estimate of the reduced-form parameters of only the endogenous instrumental variables is better 
than using all the instruments. Accordingly, we set aside the weak instruments and use only the 
significant variables in our simultaneous models.   
In model (3), following the recommendation of Hahn and Hausman (2003) and others regarding 
the potential cure for the weak instrument problems, we exclude the insignificant variables of LEND, 
R&D, Tobin’s q, and firm size in the DA0 equation and we remove NONB6 in the CM regression to keep 
only the significant variables. The results reported in model (3) confirm that underwriter prestige is 
negatively associated with earnings management. Therefore, the potential weak instrument problem does 
not change our inferences concerning the simultaneous association between underwriter reputation and 
earnings management. 
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Table 6 presents the results of the simultaneous association between underwriter reputation and 
earnings management using two alternative measures of earnings management, DAq-10 and AdjDA0 as 
dependent variables in our earnings management equations. First, in order to examine the potential impact 
of different measurement windows of earnings management on the hypothesized association, we replace 
DA0 with DAq-10, unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) and Q(0) and scaled by assets at the beginning 
of Q(-1), following Kim and Park (2005). Kim and Park (2005) use discretionary accruals over two 
quarters, Q(-1) and Q(0), to test whether equity issuers employing aggressive accounting decisions also 
more aggressively push up their offer prices, thereby leading to a decrease in underpricing. In Kim and 
Park (2005), Q(-1) is defined as the last quarter for which a financial statement is available at the time of 
the offer, and we define Q(-1) as the last quarter for which earnings are announced prior to the offering 
announcement. Though time references are not matched perfectly, the closest accrual measurement 
window is Q(-1) and Q(0) in our study.  
Second, we estimate earnings management with performance-adjusted discretionary total 
accruals, as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). They show that existing methods for estimating 
discretionary accruals are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when 
the event related to the incentive is associated with performance. Kothari et al. (2005) recommend 
adjusting discretionary accruals by subtracting discretionary accruals of control firms matched on prior-
year ROA and industry. Following Kothari et al. (2005), we match each SEO firm with a non-SEO firm 
from the same industry (using the two-digit SIC code), with the closest ROA (net income divided by 
lagged total assets) in the year ending prior to Q(-1). AdjDA0 is the unexpected accruals of the SEO firm 
minus the unexpected accruals of the performance matched, non-SEO firm, summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) 
and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1).   
As shown in Table 6, we continue to find an inverse association between underwriter reputation 
and earnings management for both alternative measures. Thus, our inferences relating to underwriter 
reputation and earnings management are unaffected when these alternative measurements of earnings 
management are employed.   
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3.3. Additional tests with AAER data  
Dechow et al. (1996) investigate the motivation of earnings management based on the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Though not all instances of earnings management are 
violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), demonstrating that SEO firms with 
less-prestigious underwriters are more likely to be subject to SEC enforcement actions will reinforce our 
findings on the effect of underwriter quality on earnings management. For 590 offerings in the final 
sample, we identify offerings that are subject to AAERs through a LexisNexis search. Issuers of 25 
offerings are subject to one or more AAERs during the period between one year prior to the offer date and 
December 2004. We read all of the AAERs that are related to these 25 offerings. We find that only one 
offering is subject to the AAER due to the misreporting of a financial statement related to the offer. The 
underwriter reputation score for this offering is 5.17, which is much lower than 8.13, the sample’s mean 
reputation score. The DA0 of the offering with AAER is 0.2142, which is much higher than 0.0190, the 
mean DA0 of the sample and the offerings without AAERs. However, because we have only one offering 
that is subject to AAER, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from this analysis.  
To further investigate the association between underwriter reputation and the incidence of 
AAERs, we conduct an out-of-sample test. We expand the analysis to include all equity offerings, both 
IPOs and SEOs, during the ten-year period between 1988 and 1997. We first search for offerings that are 
subject to AAERs. We have over 2,000 AAERs by the end of 2004. We use the keyword “offering” to 
identify 335 offering-related AAERs. Eighty-eight AAERs are eliminated because they are related to debt 
offerings, private placements, and are not related to the misreporting of financial statement at the time of 
or just prior to the offer. A single case in which a financial statement is misreported can cause multiple 
AAERs: one to the company that prepared the false financial statement and the other to the auditor, etc. 
One hundred-three AAERs are eliminated to exclude the multiple AAERs for each offering. Of the 
remaining 144 AAERs, or 144 public equity offerings associated with AAERs, 76 are related to the offers 
issued during the ten-year period between 1988 and 1997. We match these 76 offerings with public equity 
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offering data from the SDC database. Eighteen offerings are not matched with SDC data either because 
the offering is only considered and never filed with SEC or because the offering is withdrawn, or for other 
reasons. Carter-Manaster ranking data are not available for 26 of the remaining 58 offerings. Thus the 
final number of offerings that are subject to AAERs is 32. This sampling process is described in Panel A 
of Table 7. 
The Carter-Manaster rankings of the offerings that are subject to AAERs are compared to those 
of the offerings that are not subject to AAERs. We have 10,214 public equity offerings, 5,308 IPOs, and 
4,906 SEOs between 1988 and 1997. After eliminating 3,194 offerings without underwriter reputation 
scores, we have 7,020 equity offerings. Of 7,020 offerings (3,459 IPOs and 3,561 SEOs), 32 (23 IPOs and 
9 SEOs) are subject to AAERs, and 6,988 (3,436 IPOs and 3,552 SEOs) are not. Panel B shows the 
number of public equity offerings in each category. 
Panel C shows the underwriter reputation scores of offerings with AAERs and those of offerings 
without AAERs. The mean underwriter reputation score of offerings that are subject to AAERs is 7.41. 
The mean reputation score of offerings that are not subject to AAER is 8.01. The difference is statistically 
significant based on a t-test (one-tailed) and a Wilcoxon two-sample test (one-tailed) at the conventional 
level. We also replicate the same analysis separately for IPOs and SEOs. The mean underwriter reputation 
score of IPOs with AAERs is 7.40. The mean reputation score of IPOs without AAERs is 7.87. The 
difference is marginally significant based on a t-test (one-tailed) and insignificant based on a Wilcoxon 
test (one-tailed). The mean underwriter reputation score of SEOs with AAERs is smaller than the score of 
SEOs without AAERs and the difference is marginally significant based on a t-test and a Wilcoxon two-
sample test. The less-significant results might be due to the smaller sample size (of offerings with 
AAERs) when analyses are conducted separately for IPOs and SEOs. 
Overall, our results from the out-of-sample tests suggest that issuers of offerings that are subject 
to AAERs are more likely to employ less-prestigious underwriters. This result provides additional support 
for the inverse association between earnings management and underwriter reputation, and thus reinforces 
the earnings management interpretation of the accrual results. 
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3.4. Regression results of post-issue return and operating performance   
Our prediction 2 (a) posits that, after controlling for earnings management, the post-issue returns of 
seasoned equity issuers with more prestigious underwriters are expected to decline less than those of SEO 
firms with low-quality underwriters. To examine the above assertion, we first measure the post-issue 
returns by compounding the daily market-adjusted returns over the one-year period after the Q(+2) 
earnings announcement. Next, we regress the post-issue return performance on underwriter reputation, 
earnings management, and control variables as follows:   
AR1 = b0 + b1 CM + b2 DA0 + b3 ROA0 + b4 ∆ROA1 + b5 FEO2 + b6 Size + b7 BM                 (7) 
 
where AR1 is the market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) 
earnings announcement, FEO2 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm accesses the 
equity market to raise additional capital during the two-year period after the seasoned equity offering, and 
0 otherwise, and BM is the book-to-market ratio at the beginning of Q(-1). All other variables are the 
same, as previously defined. If a firm expects to access the equity market in the near future, an immediate 
decline in stock price after the offer can work negatively for future offerings. The firm expecting equity 
offers in the near future is more likely to prevent this from happening. Hence we expect that post-offering 
underperformance will be less for firms expecting equity offers shortly after the current offerings. Thus, 
we include FE02, an indicator variable that takes 1 if the firm accesses the equity market to raise 
additional capital during the two-year period after the SEO. 
Table 8 reports the regression results. The results presented in models (1) and (2) demonstrate 
that underwriter reputation is positively associated with post-issue return performance, and it has a 
distinct effect separate from the effect of earnings management on post-issue performance. The results are 
consistent with our prediction that a high-quality underwriter fulfills a strict monitoring role, lessens 
information asymmetry by closing the information gap between managers and investors, and therefore, 
reduces the extent of post-issue SEO underperformance. Consistent with previous research (Teoh et al., 
1998a & 1998b; Rangan, 1998), we find that DA0 is negatively related to post-issue performance (see 
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models (2) and (4)). As reported in model (4) of Table 8, the results remain unchanged, even after 
controlling for the industry effect. 
Prediction 2 (b) asserts that, with the underwriter’s certification and monitoring roles, post-issue 
returns of seasoned equity issuers with more prestigious underwriters and conservative earnings 
management underperform less than those of SEO firms with low-quality underwriters and aggressive 
earnings management. Thus, we examine the joint impact of underwriter quality and issuers’ earnings 
management on post-issue stock performance. 
In model (3) of Table 8, instead of CM and DA0, we include two dummy variables, D1 and D2, to 
examine the joint impact of the issuing firms’ underwriter choice and earnings management. We rank 
issuers by their underwriter CM ranking and unexpected accruals and select two extreme groups of issuers 
from the quartiles of CM and DA0. We then estimate the following model: 
AR1 = b0 + b1 ROA0 + b2 ∆ROA1 + b3 FEO2 + b4 Size + b5 BM + b6 D1 + b7 D2                 (8) 
where D1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if an issuer selects the highest-quality 
underwriter (CM >= third quartile) and the most conservative earnings manager (DA0 < first quartile), and 
0 otherwise. D2 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if an issuing firm hires the lowest-quality 
underwriter (CM < first quartile) and the most aggressive earnings manager (DA0 >= third quartile), and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are the same, as defined in the previous section. 
As predicted, we find a joint effect of an issuer’s underwriter choice and its earnings management 
on post-issue performance. As presented in model (3) of Table 8, the coefficient for D1 is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that seasoned equity issuers with the most prestigious 
underwriters and the most conservative earnings management experience higher post-issue performance 
than do those otherwise defined. We interpret this to indicate that the highest-quality underwriter and the 
most conservative earnings management jointly reduce post-issue underperformance. Conversely, D2, the 
group with the lowest-quality underwriter and the most aggressive earnings management, shows a 
negative and significant coefficient. The results indicate that the lowest-quality underwriter and the most 
aggressive earning management together significantly reduce post-issue returns. Overall, these findings 
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support our prediction 2 (b). We find that post-issue returns are positively related to the operating 
performance measures of ROA0 and ∆ROA1. In various model specifications, the coefficients on these 
variables are all statistically significant at the 1% level. FEO2 is also positively associated with post-issue 
returns, indicating that when firms intend to access the equity market to raise additional capital shortly 
after the current offerings, their post-issue return underperformance is less severe.   
 We also examine how underwriter quality is related to post-issue operating performance. For this 
task, we regress a measure of operating performance in the post-offering period, ∆ROA1, on underwriter 
reputation, unexpected total accruals, and two control variables, sales growth and growth in capital 
expenditures, following Rangan (1998). We then estimate the following equation: 
∆ROA1 = β0 + β1 CM + β2 DA0 + β3 SGROA + β4 CAPGROA            (9) 
where SGROA is the percentage growth rate in sales from year(-1) to year(0). Sales for year(0) is net sales 
summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and sales for year(-1) is net sales summed over Q(-5) to Q(-2). CAPGROA 
is the percentage growth rate in capital expenditures from year(-1) to year(0). Other variables are the 
same as defined earlier.    
 Table 9 reports the results. CM is positively associated with ∆ROA1, indicating that prestigious 
underwriters have a positive impact on the operating performance in the post-offering period. The 
coefficient on DA0 is negative and significant at the 1% level. CAPGROA shows a negative relation to 
∆ROA1. This is consistent with Rangan (1998). Together, the evidence suggested in Tables 8 and 9 
indicates that after controlling for earnings management, the choice of underwriter has an incremental 
impact on issuers’ post-issue stock and operating performance.    
 
3.5. Evidence on post-issue, long-term return performance   
To check if the relation between underwriter reputation and post-issue return lasts beyond the first year, 
we examine the long-term, post-issue return performance for up to five years after the active earnings 
management period around the SEO. Carter et al. (1998) examine the relation between underwriter 
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reputation and the three-year returns following IPOs. They provide empirical evidence that underwriter 
reputation is positively related to long-run returns. By employing three-year, holding-period returns, 
McLaughlin et al. (2000) investigate the relation between underwriter reputation and long-run, post-issue 
stock price performance in firms conducting SEOs. They find no significant relation between the two.  
We first categorize the four groups based upon underwriter reputation and the level of earnings 
management. If CM is greater than or equal to the median value and DA0 is greater than or equal to the 
median value, then the sample is classified into group 1. If CM is greater than or equal to the median 
value and DA0 is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If CM is less than 
the median value and DA0 is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified into 
group 3. If CM is less than the median value and DA0 is less than the median value, then the sample is 
classified into group 4. We choose the two extreme groups: groups 2 and 3.   
We then follow the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model approach and run the following 
regression for individual securities in each group: 
(Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit                 (10) 
where Rit is the monthly return of SEO firm i. Rft is one month treasury bill rate. Rmt – Rft is the market 
excess return in month t. SMBt is the difference between the month t return on a value-weighted portfolio 
of small stocks and one of large stocks. HMLt is the difference between the month t return on a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and eit is the 
error term. 
Table 10 presents the long-term, post-issue results for the four groups. Panel A reports the first 
year buy-and-hold returns, and the α coefficients from the Fama & French three-factor model estimated 
over 12-month, 24-month, 36-month, 48-month, and 60-month periods after the Q(+2) earnings 
announcement. The results show that, based upon buy-and-hold returns, the SEO underperformance is 
significant in groups 1, 3, and 4 in the first year after the active earnings management period around the 
SEO. However, when we control the associated risks using the Fama & French factors, post-issue return 
underperformance disappears in group 1 in one- and two-year horizons. It then becomes significantly 
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negative in the three- and four-year horizons. We find that firms in groups 3 and 4 experience significant 
underperformance in post-issue returns up to two or three years after their offerings.   
To perform difference tests between groups, we conduct t-tests and Wilcoxon tests of one-year, 
buy-and-hold returns and monthly excess returns. First, we compare two extreme groups: group 2 (high 
underwriter reputation and low earnings management) and group 3 (low underwriter reputation and high 
earnings management). Next, we control earnings management on the low side and compare groups 2 and 
4, so that we can examine the effect of underwriter reputation only. Similarly, we control earnings 
management on the high side by comparing groups 1 and 3. Panel B summarizes both the t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon test statistics for differences in post-issue returns. The differences in the one-year, buy-and-
hold returns are significant in two cases (group 2 versus 3, and group 2 versus 4). Monthly abnormal 
returns from the Fama & French three-factor model estimated over 12 months are also significant in these 
two cases. Overall, this evidence is consistent with previous results and our predictions 2 (a) and 2 (b). 
However, the effect of underwriter reputation does not last long. In particular, difference tests indicate 
that α coefficients from the Fama & French three-factor model estimated over 24-month, 36-month, 48-
month, and 60-month periods are not different across groups.   
It is puzzling that in Table 10, long-term underperformance lasts until year 4 for the high EM and 
high CM group, while it only lasts until year 2 in the high EM and low CM group. This seems 
inconsistent with the earlier results. The post-issue underperformance resulting from high EM is more 
intense in year 1 for the low CM group than the high CM group. However, it seems that the EM effect 
lasts longer in the high CM group than in the low CM group. We interpret the results as follows. For the 
high CM, high EM group, post-issue performance of the issuers with the most aggressive EM will be 
worse off and returns will adjust to that. However, underwriters’ high reputation helps reduce a dramatic 
decline in the long-term performance immediately after the offerings, and therefore the underperformance 
lasts longer. Firms in the low CM, high EM group do not enjoy protection from high-reputation 
underwriters, and therefore experience a significant drop in the post-issue return adjustment shortly after 
offerings.  
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4. Summary 
For new equity issuers, the underwriter’s certification and monitoring roles are important. Since high-
reputation underwriters act as credible certifiers of information regarding equity-issuing firms for less-
informed investors, equity issuers attempt to reduce investor uncertainty about the firms’ value by hiring 
prestigious underwriters. Reputable underwriters have an incentive to minimize an issuer’s aggressive 
earnings management to protect their reputation capital and reduce litigation costs. Accordingly, issuers 
that intend to engage in aggressive earnings management select underwriters with lower reputations.    
We empirically examine the relation between underwriter choice and incentives for earnings 
management around SEOs and its impact on post-issue performance. We predict that there is an inverse 
association between underwriter reputation and earnings management and a positive relation between 
underwriter reputation and post-issue performance, and that the post-issue returns of firms with high-
quality underwriters and conservative earnings management are higher than those of firms with low-
quality underwriters and aggressive earnings management.   
Consistent with these predictions, we find that (1) underwriter reputation is a decreasing function 
of the incentive for earnings management and vice versa. We interpret these results to mean that issuers 
with minimal incentives for earnings management hire high-quality underwriters, while high-reputation 
underwriters inhibit aggressive earnings management. Conversely, aggressive earnings managers invite 
low-quality underwriters to avoid stringent monitoring; (2) underwriter reputation has a positive impact 
on post-issue returns and operating performance after controlling for earnings management and other 
confounding effects. However, the effect of underwriter reputation on post-issue returns does not last 
long; (3) seasoned equity issuers with the lowest-quality underwriters and the most aggressive earnings 
management experience more dramatic declines in post-issue return performance than firms using the 
most prestigious underwriters and the most conservative earnings management. 
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Notes
                                                          
1 For example, Healy (1985) documents that in a costly contract setting, managers adjust discretionary 
accruals to report a high level of earnings.   
2 Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain to managers or shareholders.” Healey and 
Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as follows: Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers. We follow these definitions of 
earnings management throughout the paper. 
3 Since firms conducting SEOs are usually larger, older, and better covered by analysts than IPOs, the 
underwriter reputation concern might be more serious in SEOs. 
4 We acknowledge that it is not entirely a firm’s decision to select the underwriters. Fernando et al. (2005) 
suggest that issuers and underwriters mutually select each other. We examine whether prestigious 
underwriters avoid equity issuers with aggressive pre-SEO earnings management in the later analyses. 
In addition, due to the fact that high-quality underwriters are not equally accessible to small firms, it is 
more difficult for small firms to hire prestigious underwriters. Thus, we control the size variable in the 
following analyses. 
5 Zhou and Elder (2004) provide evidence of the negative relation between auditor quality and earnings 
management around the SEOs. Though high-reputation underwriters use high-quality auditors more 
frequently (Balvers et al., 1988), we argue that the effect of underwriter reputation is distinct from that 
of auditor quality. As shown in Tables 5 and 6, after controlling for the auditor variable, underwriter 
reputation always shows a significant association with earnings management, and the association is 
stronger than that of the auditor variable. We find that the auditor variable becomes significant when 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the underwriter variable is dropped from the earnings management equation. Our findings are in line 
with the theory (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992). 
6 Another possible interpretation is that well-known information-processing biases, like optimism, also play 
a role. As Dichev and Piotroski (2001) point out, optimism naturally results in more erroneous 
conclusions when applied to fairly negative situations, and thus negative situations are followed by 
subsequent, more extreme adjustments in stock prices. 
7 McLaughlin, et al. (2000) suggest that hiring a low-quality underwriter is a bad signal to the market. It is 
also known that the issues with low-quality underwriters are underpriced more. Therefore, issuers will 
hire low-quality underwriters only if the benefits of earnings management exceed the costs of not hiring 
reputable underwriters (Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992). Kim and Park (2005) provide empirical evidence 
that underpricing is smaller for issuers that aggressively manage earnings. Their result suggests that the 
benefits of earnings management exist. 
8 See the reduction of information asymmetries in an IPO context from Titman and Trueman (1986), Carter 
and Manaster (1990), Michaely and Shaw (1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Carter et al. 
(1998), among others. 
9 Several studies, including Altınkılıç and Hansen (2003), Corwin (2003), and Mola and Loughran (2004), 
report that the underpricing of SEOs has become commonplace and that the magnitude of SEO 
underpricing has increased more dramatically in the 1990s than it did during earlier periods. Corwin 
(2003) documents that SEO underpricing increased to 2.92% for offers during the 1990-1998 period from 
1.15% for offers in the 1980s and that the average reached a high of 3.72% in 1996.  
10 Though an updated list of the Carter-Manaster ranks is available on the Jay Ritter’s web site, it is 
inappropriate for our sample offerings because Ritter’s rankings are based on data up to 2000. Since our 
sample period ends in 1997, updated underwriter reputation rankings based on the deals up to 2000 are 
unavailable for issuers in our sample. 
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11 The change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables (equation 2), when the normal, current 
accruals are estimated. This implicitly assumes that all changes in uncollected credit sales at the end of 
the event period result from earnings management. The reasoning behind this modification is that 
earnings are easier to manage via credit sales than cash sales (Dechow et al., 1995). 
12 If there are less than 10 firms in the same two-digit industry group, then the observation is dropped to 
mitigate the error in the prediction model. 
13 Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), Tobin’s q is calculated as: {[Market value of common stock + Book 
value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value 
of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} in the last fiscal year ending 
before the SEO announcement. 
14 In equation (6), ∆ROA1 is the proxy for the expected changes in performance in the near future. If ∆ROA1 
and unexpected accruals (DA0) are positively associated, then issuers manage earnings to signal their 
improving future performance. In such a case, the correlation between underwriter quality and unexpected 
accruals is not necessarily negative. In addition, DeFond and Park (1997) find that a firm’s current 
accruals are inversely related to the firm’s future earnings performance. Thus, if a firm expects that its 
performance is improving, it is less likely to use accruals to make its investor image more positive. To 
control these effects, ∆ROA1 is included in the regression. 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics of seasoned equity offerings 
 
Panel A: Size characteristics 
        Total 
 assets 
 Market
   value 
Book
 value
 Offer 
amount
 Offer 
    size 
Mean 1,113.16  958.33 319.81 96.40  0.24 
Median 207.59  263.86 78.64 53.79  0.19 
Std. Dev. 4,107.89  3,922.56 1,013.86 144.42  0.37 
 
Panel B: Time distribution 
Year Frequency % 
1990 27 4.58 
1991 87 14.75 
1992 76 12.88 
1993 66 11.19 
1994 44 7.46 
1995 71 12.03 
1996 103 17.40 
1997 116 19.66 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution 
Industry Two-digit SIC codes Frequency % 
Oil and gas 13 71 12.03 
Food products 20 7 1.19 
Paper and paper products 24,25,26,27 26 4.41 
Chemical products 28 70 11.86 
Manufacturing 30-34 31 5.25 
Computer equipment and services 35,73 63 10.68 
Electronic equipment 36 47 7.97 
Transportation 37,39,40-42,44,45 37 6.27 
Scientific instruments 38 28 4.75 
Communications 48 26 4.41 
Electricity, gas, and sanitary services 49 26 4.41 
Durable goods 50 24 4.07 
Retail 53,54,56,57,59 54 9.15 
Eating and drinking establishments 58 2 0.34 
Entertainment services 70,78,79 12 2.03 
Health 80 16 2.71 
All others  50 8.47 
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Table 1. continued. 
 
 
The sample consists of 590 seasoned equity offerings of common stock by industrial US firms over the period 1990 through 
1997. We terminate our SEO sample in 1997 in order to examine post-offering returns up to five years after the active earnings 
management period. Sample offerings are collected from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. The total assets, 
market value of equity and book value of equity are measured at the end of the quarter before the offering announcement. The 
total assets, market value of equity, book value of equity and offering amount are measured in millions of dollars. Offer size is 
computed as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before the offering. 
 36
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Median          First 
quartile
         Third  
   quartile
      Standard 
deviation
t-values Prob>t
CM 8.1271 8.7500 7.5000 8.8800 1.3537 145.83 0.0001
DA0 0.0190 0.0154 -0.0472 0.0774 0.1848 2.68 0.0075
AR1 -0.1818 -0.1848 -0.4796 0.0632 0.3992 -11.25 0.0001
NONB6 0.0999 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 8.69 0.0001
ROA0 0.0104 0.0545 0.0014 0.1120 0.2299 1.10 0.2725
∆ROA1 -0.0169 -0.0099 -0.0579 0.0190 0.1201 -3.53 0.0004
OCFlow0 0.0213 0.0720 -0.0249 0.1466 0.2931 1.89 0.0592
Size 5.4208 5.4014 4.4240 6.4782 1.5833 88.29 0.0001
Off_Size 0.2686 0.1990 0.1190 0.3120 0.3773 18.50 0.0001
LEND 0.8195 1.2495 0.5456 2.2225 18.5279 1.15 0.2506
FEO2 0.1909 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3933 12.67 0.0001
BM 0.3869 0.3378 0.1901 0.5211 0.3715 26.86 0.0001
 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analyses for a full sample of 590 offerings except for 
ROA0. Descriptive statistics of ROA0 is calculated based on 587 offerings after eliminating three offerings with extreme ROA0. 
The mean value of ROA0 is -0.0087 with insignificant t-value when three offerings with extreme ROA0 are included. CM is 
Carter-Manaster Reputation Ranking. DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the 
beginning of Q(-1), where Q (-1) is the quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering announcement, Q(0) is the 
quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement, and all other quarters are similarly indexed relative 
to the offering announcement. AR1 is market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) 
earnings announcement. NONB6 is an indicator variable of auditor quality and is set to equal 1 for NON-Big-Six auditor, 0 
otherwise. ROA0 is Year(0) ROA and it is measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and 
scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). ∆ROA1 is changes in ROA and it is measured as 'year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA'. Year(1) 
ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3). 
OCFlow0 is cash flows from operating activities summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). Size 
is log of market value of equity at the beginning of Q(-1). Off_Size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the 
number of shares outstanding before the offering. LEND is long-term debt over total stockholders’ equity. FEO2 is an indicator 
variable which is set to equal 1 if the firm accesses the capital market to raise additional capital during the two-year period after 
the seasoned equity offering and 0 otherwise. BM  is Book-to-market ratio at the beginning of Q(-1). 
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Table 3. Bivariate correlations among selected variables 
 
 CM DA0 AR1 NONB6 ROA0 ∆ROA1 OCFlow0 Size Off_Size LEND FEO2 BM 
CM  1 -0.1170 a     0.1868 a  -0.1638 a   0.2666 a   0.0027  0.3209 a   0.4720 a  -0.1200 a  -0.0150 -0.0490  0.0100 
DA0 -0.0983
b    1 -0.1735 a   0.1551 a   0.0988 b  -0.1612 a  -0.2712 a  -0.0924 b   0.0010 -0.0289 -0.0507  0.0283 
AR1  0.2037
a  -0.1278 a   1 -0.0267  0.0802  0.2346 a   0.1627 a   0.1631 a  -0.0558  0.0457  0.1838 a   0.0996 b  
NONB6 -0.1233 a   0.1588 a  -0.0403  1  0.0115 -0.0101 -0.0515 -0.1898 a   0.0188  0.0054  0.0609  0.0153 
ROA0  0.0093  0.2507
a   0.0570  0.0672  1 -0.5018 a   0.8408 a   0.2094 a  -0.0477 -0.0051 -0.0298  0.0587 
∆ROA1  0.0502 -0.2177 a   0.3314 a  -0.0090 -0.4554 a   1 -0.2868 a   0.0011  0.0565  0.0105  0.0832  0.0170 
OCFlow0  0.1624
a  -0.3857 a   0.1921 a  -0.0411  0.5271 a  -0.1442 a   1  0.2559 a  -0.0380  0.0061  0.0131  0.0614 
Size  0.4839 a  -0.0789  0.1948 a  -0.1695 a   0.1213 a   0.0121  0.2416 a   1 -0.3737 a  -0.0045  0.0048 -0.1139 a  
Off_Size -0.2299 a   0.0388 -0.1339 a   0.0916 b  -0.0680  0.0317 -0.1235 a  -0.6782 a   1  0.0185 -0.0331  0.0841 b  
LEND  0.1512 a  -0.0157  0.1085 b  -0.0603 -0.1062 b   0.0768  0.0941 b   0.1474 a  -0.0053  1  0.0211  0.0748 
FEO2 -0.0058 -0.0712  0.1919 a   0.0609 -0.0646  0.1398 a   0.0385 -0.0070 -0.0450  0.1116 a   1  0.0413 
BM  0.0770  0.0618  0.1141 a  -0.0241 -0.1243 a   0.0428 -0.0178 -0.0996 b   0.1282 a   0.3382 a   0.0661  1 
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Table 3. continued. 
 
 
Upper-triangle presents Pearson correlations and lower-triangle presents Spearman correlations of variables. CM is Carter-Manaster Reputation Ranking. DA0 is unexpected 
accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1), where Q(-1) is the quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering 
announcement, Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement, and all other quarters are similarly indexed relative to the offering 
announcement. AR1 is market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. NONB6 is an indicator variable of auditor 
quality and is set to equal 1 for NON-Big-Six auditor, 0 otherwise. ROA0 is Year(0) ROA and it is measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and 
scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). ∆ROA1 is changes in ROA and it is measured as 'year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA'. Year(1) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed 
over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3). OCFlow0 is cash flows from operating activities  summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the 
beginning of Q(-1). Size is log of market value of equity at the beginning of Q(-1). Off_Size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares 
outstanding before the offering. LEND is long-term debt over total stockholders’ equity. FEO2 is an indicator variable which is set to equal 1 if the firm accesses the capital market 
to raise additional capital during the two-year period after the seasoned equity offering and 0 otherwise. BM is Book-to-market ratio at the beginning of Q(-1). 
a Significant at the 1% level based on a two-sided test.  b  Significant at the 5% level based on a two-sided test.
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Table 4. Underwriter reputation, earnings management, and post-issue performance of SEOs 
 
Panel A: Underwriter ranking, unexpected accruals, and post-issue returns for 30 individual underwriters 
   # of       DA0   AR1 
 SEOs   CM Mean Median Mean Median
Goldman, Sachs & Company 45 9 0.0042 0.0029 -0.0991 -0.0718
Salomon Brothers 31 9 -0.0023 -0.0218 -0.1144 -0.1335
First Boston Corp. 30 9 -0.0081 0.0163 -0.1180 -0.0232
Hambrecht & Quist 21 9 -0.0515 0.0145 -0.0208 -0.0947
Merrill Lynch White Weld Cap. 57 8.88 0.0057 0.0048 -0.0859 -0.0731
Morgan Stanley & Company 42 8.88 0.0114 0.0173 -0.0976 -0.1048
Brown, Alex & Sons 22 8.88 -0.0203 -0.0172 -0.1365 -0.2287
Kidder, Peabody, & Company 10 8.83 0.0547 0.0358 -0.3990 -0.3883
Shearson Lehmann 2 8.83 -0.0419 -0.0419 -0.1950 -0.1950
Wertheim & Company 1 8.83 -0.0655 -0.0655 N/A N/A
High-Reputation Group Total 261 -0.0017 0.0063 -0.1106 -0.0878
(p-value)     (0.8436) (0.4875) (0.0001) (0.0001)
          
Dillon Read 12 8.63 -0.0509 -0.0773 -0.0168 0.0107
Dean Witter Reynolds 1 8.5 0.2208 0.2208 -0.7283 -0.7283
Edwards, A. G. & Sons 4 8 0.0455 0.0333 -0.0239 0.0101
Blair, D. H. & Company 1 8 -0.0821 -0.0821 -0.9549 -0.9549
Oppenheimer & Company 11 7.88 -0.0373 0.0289 -0.2695 -0.3746
Blair, William & Company 9 7.88 0.1228 0.1398 -0.3362 -0.2921
Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood 2 7.75 -0.0307 -0.0307 -0.5301 -0.5301
Dain Bosworth 5 7.63 0.1543 0.1283 -0.3255 -0.4068
Lehman Brothers, Kuhn Loeb, Inc. 40 7.5 -0.0017 0.0135 -0.1844 -0.1146
Robinson-Humphrey Company 6 7.38 0.0846 0.0501 -0.3674 -0.3542
Median-Reputation Group Total 91 0.0177 0.0161 -0.2242 -0.2312
(p-value)     (0.2444) (0.1600) (0.0001) (0.0001)
          
Paulson Investment Company 5 5 0.1981 0.0924 -0.5390 -0.6422
Brean Murray, Foster 1 5 -0.0764 -0.0764 -0.8872 -0.8872
Parker/Hunter 1 4.88 0.1968 0.1968 0.4394 0.4394
Reich & Company 1 4 0.1974 0.1974 -0.5782 -0.5782
Wedbush, Noble, Cooke 1 4 0.3809 0.3809 -0.7562 -0.7562
Van Kasper& Company 3 3.5 0.0820 -0.0099 -0.4240 -0.4240
Whale Securities Corp. 3 3.33 0.2421 0.1622 -0.5519 -0.6042
Donald, N. & Company Sec. 1 3 -0.2314 -0.2314 0.6060 0.6060
Keane Securities 1 3 0.0190 0.0190 -0.3474 -0.3474
Steichen, R. J. & Company 2 1 0.0066 0.0066 -0.2042 -0.2042
Low-Reputation Group Total 19 0.1296 0.0657 -0.3877 -0.5709
(p-value)     (0.0365) (0.0494) (0.0026) (0.0067)
          
t-valueH-L     -3.68***   2.79*** 
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Table 4. continued. 
 
Panel B: Relationship between underwriter reputation, earnings management, and post-issue performance for full sample 
Underwriter reputation groups DA0  AR1 
  Obs. Mean (p-value) Median (p-value)  Obs. Mean (p-value) Median (p-value)
Lowest CM =< 1Q 150 0.0331 (0.0090) 0.0164 (0.0162)  132 -0.2896 (0.0001) -0.3132 (0.0001)
2 1Q < CM =< Median 179 0.0112 (0.3498) 0.0158 (0.0512)  165 -0.1834 (0.0001) -0.1982 (0.0001)
3 Median < CM =< 3Q 134 0.0057 (0.6592) 0.0142 (0.1119)  118 -0.1274 (0.0003) -0.1263 (0.0002)
Highest CM > 3Q 127 -0.0095 (0.4219) 0.0029 (0.5432)  119 -0.0941 (0.0136) -0.0752 (0.0101)
  Total        590          534   
t-valueH-L   -2.48**    3.91***  
 
 
These tables present the descriptive statistics of unexpected accruals and one-year post-issue returns for 30 individual underwriters in Panel A and the various underwriter 
reputation groups in Panel B. CM  is Carter-Manaster Reputation Ranking. DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1), 
where the quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering announcement is labeled Q(-1) and Q(+2) is the second quarter of the first earnings announcement after the 
offering announcement. AR1 is market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement.   
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Table 5. Simultaneous association between underwriter reputation and earnings management 
 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: 
CM 
Dependent variable: 
DA0 
Dependent variable: 
CM 
Dependent variable: 
DA0 
 Dependent variable: CM 
Dependent variable: 
DA0 
         
DA0 -2.0775   -2.0449    -2.3122   
 (-5.61) ***  (-5.10) ***   (-5.80) ***  
CM   -0.6587   -0.0680   -0.0771  
   (-6.79) ***  (-2.93) ***  (-3.31) *** 
NONB6 -0.1116  -0.0967  -0.1423  0.0864   0.0939  
 (-0.49)  (-0.86)  (-0.62)  (1.78) *  (2.19) ** 
ROA0 0.4192   0.5731    0.6010   
 (1.72) *  (2.28) **   (2.38) **  
OCFlow0   0.2586   -0.2102   -0.1892  
   (1.94) *  (-3.30) ***  (-3.05) *** 
∆ROA1   -0.1332   -0.5101   -0.4874  
   (-2.01) **  (-10.60) ***  (-10.24) *** 
Size 0.3399  0.2303  0.3261    0.2927   
 (8.04) *** (5.76) *** (7.37) ***   (7.01) ***  
Off_Size -0.0950   0.2156      
 (-1.23)   (1.55)      
LEND   -0.0004   -0.0001    
   (-1.03)   (-0.09)    
R&D 0.0328  0.0211  0.0346  0.0006  0.0322   
 (1.92) * (2.44) ** (2.02) ** (0.16)  (2.13) **  
Tobin’s q -0.0672  -0.0429  -0.0564  -0.0016  -0.0523   
 (-2.00) ** (-2.51) ** (-1.68) * (-0.24)  (-1.76) *  
         
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Number of observations     487                    487                       487 
System weighted R2  36.51%                     33.50%                        33.97% 
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Table 5. continued. 
 
 
This table reports results of association between underwriter reputation and earnings management in the systems of the three stage least square equations. CM is Carter-Manaster 
Reputation Ranking. DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). NONB6 is an indicator variable of auditor quality and 
is set to equal 1 for NON-Big-Six auditor, 0 otherwise. ROA0 is Year(0) ROA and it is measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by 
assets at the beginning of Q(-1). OCFlow0 is cash flows from operating activities  summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). ∆ROA1 is changes in 
ROA and it is measured as 'year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA'. Year(1) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets at the beginning of 
Q(+3). Size is log of market value of equity at the beginning of Q(-1). Off_Size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding before the 
offering. LEND is long-term debt over total stockholders’ equity. R&D is R&D intensity in the last fiscal year ending before SEO announcement and calculated as the ratio of the 
annual R&D expenditures to total sales. Tobin’s q is Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure of Tobins’ q and calculated as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred 
stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} in the last fiscal 
year ending before SEO announcement. *** (**)  Significant at the 1% (5%) level based on a two-sided test. 
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Table 6. Simultaneous association between underwriter reputation and earnings management – Alternative earnings management proxies 
 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: 
CM 
Dependent variable: 
DAq-10 
Dependent variable: 
CM 
Dependent variable: 
DAq-10 
 Dependent variable: CM 
Dependent variable: 
AdjDA0 
         
DAq-10 -2.0493   -2.2993      
 (-4.55) ***  (-4.95) ***   -3.5555   
AdjDA0       (-7.00) ***  
         
CM   -0.5710   -0.0586   -0.0769  
   (-9.12) ***  (-2.89) ***  (-3.09) *** 
NONB6 -0.2138  -0.1173   0.0659   0.1036  
 (-0.96)  (-1.46)   (1.73) *  (2.25) ** 
ROA0 0.4139   0.6388    -0.3162   
 (1.70) *  (2.46) **   (-1.13)   
OCFlow0   0.1964   -0.1542   -0.3149  
   (2.04) **  (-2.99) ***  (-4.63) *** 
∆ROA1   -0.2492   -0.5074   -0.0261  
   (-3.83) ***  (-11.64) ***  (-0.40)  
Size 0.3327  0.2061  0.3116    0.2561   
 (7.63) *** (7.88) *** (7.63) ***   (5.38) ***  
Off_Size -0.4809        
 (-2.41) **       
LEND   -0.0004       
   (-1.18)       
R&D 0.0334  0.0191  0.0325    0.0304   
 (1.94) * (3.00) *** (2.09) **   (1.99) **  
Tobin’s q -0.0695  -0.0353  -0.0565    -0.0368   
 (-2.07) ** (-2.87) *** (-1.86) *   (-0.84)   
         
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Number of observations    498                   498                       353 
System weighted R2 36.88%                    32.58%                        37.82% 
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Table 6. continued. 
 
 
This table reports results of association between underwriter reputation and earnings management, conditional on disclosure frequency changes immediately preceding the SEO 
announcement. The systems of the three stage least square equations are estimated separately for the sample SEOs whose issuers increase disclosure frequency during the six-
month period immediately preceding the offering announcement, and for the sample SEOs whose issuers do not increase disclosure frequency. CM is Carter-Manaster Reputation 
Ranking. DAq-10 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) and Q(0) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). AdjDA0 is unexpected accruals of SEO firm minus the 
unexpected accruals of the performance matched, non-SEO firm, summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). NONB6 is an indicator variable of 
auditor quality and is set to equal 1 for NON-Big-Six auditor, 0 otherwise. ROA0 is Year(0) ROA and it is measured as income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to 
Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). OCFlow0 is cash flows from operating activities  summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). 
∆ROA1 is changes in ROA and it is measured as 'year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA'. Year(1) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by assets 
at the beginning of Q(+3). Size is log of market value of equity at the beginning of Q(-1). Off_Size is computed as the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares 
outstanding before the offering. LEND is long-term debt over total stockholders’ equity. R&D is R&D intensity in the last fiscal year ending before SEO announcement and 
calculated as the ratio of the annual R&D expenditures to total sales. Tobin’s q is Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure of Tobins’ q and calculated as {[Market value of common stock 
+ Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of 
total assets} in the last fiscal year ending before SEO announcement. *** (**)  Significant at the 1% (5%) level based on a two-sided test. 
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Table 7. Out-of-sample test of the association between underwriter reputation and incidence of AAERs 
 
Panel A: Number of offerings subject to AAERs 
Initial search of AAERs (by 12/31/2004) with a keyword "offering" 335  
less: debt offerings, private placement, offerings not related to AAERs 88  
      247  
less: duplicate AAERs     103  
      144  
less: AAERs related to offerings prior to 1988 and after 1997 68  
      76  
less: not matched with SDC data (includes offerings only considered,   
    withdrawn, etc.) 
 
18  
      58  
less: Carter-Manaster ranking is not available   26  
AAERs used in analyses     32 23 IPOs & 9 SEOs 
 
Panel B: Number of public equity offerings during 1988-1997 
 IPOs and SEOs  IPOs  SEOs 
Equity offerings  
during 1988-1997 10,214  5,308  4,906 
less: No underwriter  
   reputation score 3,194  1,849  1,.345 
 7,020  3,459  3,561 
         
 w/ AAER w/o AAER  w/ AAER w/o AAER  w/ AAER w/o AAER 
 32 6,988  23 3,436  9 3,552 
 
Panel C: Underwriter reputation scores of equity offerings with and without AAERs 
 IPOs and SEOs IPOs  SEOs 
 w/ AAER w/o AAER w/ AAER w/o AAER w/ AAER w/o AAER
Number of observations 32 6988 23 3436 9 3552 
Mean 7.41 8.01 7.40  7.87 7.43 8.14 
Standard deviation 2.15 1.57 2.31 1.75 1.80  1.36 
Minimum 1 0 1 0 4.5 0 
Maximum 9 9 9 9 8.88 9 
         
Difference tests         
t-test p-value 0.0157  0.0994  0.0598 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0312  0.1189  0.0902 
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Table 7. continued. 
 
 
Panel A and B of this table present the sampling process and Panel C presents the results from the out-of-sample tests examining 
the association between underwriter reputation and the incidence of AAERs (Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release) 
through the Lexis Nexis search. We expand the analysis to include all equity offerings, both IPOs and SEOs, during the ten-year 
period between 1988 and 1997. 
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Table 8. Regression of post-issue market-adjusted returns on underwriter reputation 
 
Independent Dependent variable = AR1 
variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model4  
       
Intercept -0.6297  -0.5699  -0.2809  N.A.  
 (-5.69) *** (-5.15) *** (-3.85) ***   
CM 0.0405  0.0369   0.0437  
 (2.82) *** (2.59) ***  (2.93) *** 
DA0   -0.4043   -0.2290  
   (-3.56) ***  (-2.68) *** 
ROA0 0.5300  0.5742 0.5815 0.5565 
 (5.80) *** (6.29) *** (6.39) *** (5.19) *** 
∆ROA1 1.2819  1.2415  1.2833  1.2455  
 (7.79) *** (7.61) *** (7.86) *** (7.26) *** 
FEO2 0.1774  0.1721  0.1738  0.1830  
 (4.42) *** (4.33) *** (4.37) *** (4.41) *** 
Size 0.0118  0.0075  0.0086  0.0096  
 (0.96)  (0.62)  (0.73)  (0.72)  
BM 0.0786  0.0802  0.0711  0.1017  
 (1.86)  (1.92)  (1.69)  (2.18) ** 
D1    0.0929    
    (2.27) **   
D2    -0.2156    
    (-3.33) ***   
Industry dummies No  No  No  Yes  
       
Number of observations 509  509  509  509  
Adjusted R2 17.73%  19.60% 19.03% 17.19% 
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Table 8. continued. 
 
 
This table presents regression results of post-issue market adjusted buy-and-hold returns on underwriter reputation, earnings 
management and other control variables. AR1 is market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the 
Q(+2) earnings announcement, where Q(+2) is the second quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering 
announcement. CM is Carter-Manaster Reputation Ranking. DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled 
by assets at the beginning of Q(-1), where Q(-1) is the quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering 
announcement, Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement, and all other quarters are 
similarly indexed relative to the offering announcement. ROA0 is Year(0) ROA and it is measured as income before extraordinary 
items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). ∆ROA1 is changes in ROA and it is measured 
as ‘year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA’. Year(1) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and scaled by 
assets at the beginning of Q(+3). FEO2 is an indicator variable which is set to equal 1 if the firm accesses the capital market to 
raise additional capital during the two-year period after the seasoned equity offering and 0 otherwise. Size is log of market value 
of equity at the beginning of Q(-1). BM is Book-to-market ratio at the beginning of Q(-1). If CM >= third quartile (CM) and DA0 
< first quartile (DA0) then D1=1, otherwise D1=0. If CM < first quartile (CM) and DA0 >= third quartile (DA0) then D2=1, 
otherwise D2=0.  *** (**) Significant at the 1% (5%) level based on a two-sided test.    
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Table 9. Regression of post-issue operating performance on underwriter reputation 
 
Independent Dependent variable = ∆ROA1 
variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
      
Intercept -0.0131  -0.1431  -0.1283  
 (-1.98) ** (-3.39) *** (-3.05) *** 
CM   0.0155  0.0140  
   (3.07) *** (2.77) *** 
DA0 -0.1447   -0.1310  
 (-3.15) ***  (-2.86) *** 
SGROA 0.0054 0.0049 0.0047 
 (0.67)  (0.61)  (0.59)  
CAPGROA -0.0470  -0.0410  -0.0434  
 (-2.10) ** (-1.83) * (-1.95) ** 
      
Number of observations 467  467  467  
Adjusted R2 2.34% 2.23% 3.72% 
 
 
This table presents regression results of post-issue operating performance on underwriter reputation, earnings management and 
other control variables. This table follows Rangan (1998)’s specification for the test. ∆ROA1 is changes in ROA and it is 
measured as 'year(1) ROA – year(0) ROA'. Year(1) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(+3) to Q(+6) and 
scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(+3). Year(0) ROA is income before extraordinary items summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and 
scaled by assets at the beginning of Q(-1). DA0 is unexpected accruals summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and scaled by assets at the 
beginning of Q(-1), where Q(-1) is the quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering announcement, Q(0) is the 
quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement, and all other quarters are similarly indexed relative 
to the offering announcement. CM is Carter-Manaster Reputation Ranking. SGROA is the percentage growth rate in sales from 
year(-1) to year(0). Sales for year(0) is net sales summed over Q(-1) to Q(+2) and sales for year(-1) is net sales summed over Q(-
5) to Q(-2). CAPGROA is the percentage growth rate in capital expenditures from year(-1) to year(0). *** (**) Significant at the 
1% (5%) level based on a two-sided test.  
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Table 10. Long-term post-issue return performance and difference tests 
 
Panel A: post-issue returns 
 Group 1 (High CM, High EM)  Group 2 (High CM , Low EM)  Group 3 (Low CM, High EM)  Group 4 (Low CM, Low EM) 
 Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median  
1 year Buy-and-hold returns                
 -0.14534 *** -0.11456 ***  -0.03053  -0.02091   -0.20736 *** -0.19823 ***  -0.18536 *** -0.21113 *** 
          
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months          
 -0.00460  -0.00726   -0.00100  -0.00042   -0.01056 *** -0.00730 ***  -0.00922 *** -0.00834 *** 
                
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months          
 -0.00456  -0.00589   -0.00282  -0.00165   -0.00619 *** -0.00572 ***  -0.00602 *** -0.00654 *** 
                
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months          
 -0.00562 ** -0.00458 **  -0.00178  -0.00157   -0.00443 ** -0.00294   -0.00340  -0.00182  
                
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months          
 -0.00450 ** -0.00535 **  0.00193  0.00008   -0.00225  -0.00168   -0.00083  -0.00170  
                
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months          
 -0.00293  -0.00177   0.00152  -0.00174   -0.00040  0.00145   -0.00078  -0.00107  
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Table 10. continued. 
 
Panel B: P-values from the One-tailed t-tests and Wilcoxon tests of post-issue returns between groups 
         Group 2 vs. Group 3  Group 2 vs. Group 4  Group 1 vs. Group 3 
1 year Buy-and-hold returns     0.0001 (0.0001)  0.0005 (0.0004)  0.1021 (0.0942) 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 12 months 0.0193 (0.0337)  0.0398 (0.0390)  0.0996 (0.1326) 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 24 months 0.1564 (0.0977)  0.1621 (0.1696)  0.3319 (0.3505) 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 36 months 0.2027 (0.1797)  0.3094 (0.2527)  0.3533 (0.4153) 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 48 months 0.1043 (0.1441)  0.2089 (0.2270)  0.2219 (0.1758) 
Monthly abnormal returns from Fama French three-factor model estimated over 60 months 0.2699 (0.3469)  0.2337 (0.3878)  0.2028 (0.0757) 
 
 
Panel A presents the post-issue returns up to five years after Q(+2) earnings announcement, where Q(+2) is the second quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering 
announcement. Buy-and-hold returns are market-adjusted returns compounded daily over the one-year period after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. Three-factor model α 
coefficients are alphas from the Fama-French thee-factor model estimated over 12 month to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The following regression is 
estimated for each firm: (Rit – Rft) = α + b1 (Rmt – Rft) + b2 SMBt + b3 HMLt + eit where Rit is monthly return of SEO firm in 12 to 60 month periods after the Q(+2) earnings 
announcement. If CM is greater than or equal to the median value and DA0 is greater than or equal to the median value, then the sample is classified into group 1. If CM is greater 
than or equal to the median value and DA0 is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into group 2. If CM is less than the median value and DA0 is greater than or 
equal to the median value, then the sample is classified into group 3. If CM is less than the median value and DA0 is less than the median value, then the sample is classified into 
group 4.  *** (**) Significant at the 1% (5%) level based on a one-sided test.  
Panel B shows the p-values for the one-tailed t-test (p-values for the one-tailed Wilcoxon test in the parentheses) of post-issue returns between groups. 
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Figure 1. Time line of seasoned equity offerings 
 
This figure shows our timing convention. Q(.) represents the quarters around a SEO. The quarter of the last earnings announcement before the offering announcement is labeled 
Q(-1). Q(0) is the quarter of the first earnings announcement after the offering announcement. All other quarters are similarly indexed relative to the offering announcement. Eann 
stands for earnings announcement. SEOann represents SEO announcement. We measure post-issue returns by compounding daily market-adjusted returns over the one-year period 
after the Q(+2) earnings announcement. The figure also illustrates important event dates and periods around SEO. 1933 Securities Act prohibits any “offer to sell” prior to the 
filing of the registration statement before the file of the offer. It also prohibits any sales prior to the effective date. The period between the date of file and the effective date is 
“Waiting Period”. The average Waiting Period in Rangan (1998) is 35 days. In our sample the average Waiting Period is 49 days and the median is 35 days. Lock-up agreements 
between issuing firms and their underwriters prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings until 90 to 180 days after the offering date. 
 
 
 
